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 1  INTRODUCTION  
  
Section 49
2
 of the Criminal Procedure Act
3
 (hereafter CPA) provides for the use of force 
during arrest.  This provision recently came under the spotlight in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal
4
 as well as in the Constitutional Court.
5
  Section 49 of the CPA is shrouded in 
controversy, as the proposed amendment (section 7 of the Judicial Matters Second 
Amendment Act, 122 of 1998) has not yet been put into operation because of the 
resistance of the Minister of Safety and Security.   
  
Before the abovementioned cases the position was as follows: Section 49(1),
6
 which 
has not been struck down by the Constitutional Court, allows the use of reasonable 
force in the circumstances where a person:  
(a) resists against an attempt to arrest him; and  
(b)  flees when it is clear that there is an attempt to arrest him or resists and then flees.  
  
Subsection (2), prior to it being struck down by the Constitutional Court in the Walters
7
 
case, dealt with so-called "justifiable homicide".  Where a person stood to be arrested 
for committing a Schedule 1
8
 offence, or where a person was reasonably suspected to 
have committed such a schedule 1 offence, the person attempting the arrest was 
allowed to use deadly force where there was no other way to arrest the suspect or to 
prevent the suspect from fleeing.   
 
*    Stephen de la Harpe BA et Comm, LLB, LLM, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, PU for CHE and Tharien van der   
Walt, B-Proc, LLB, LLM, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, PU for CHE.  
1    Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
2    Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
3    Note 1 above.  
4    Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA).  
5    Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC).  
6    Note 2 above.  
7    Note 5 above.  
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As early as 1978 the then Appellate Division stated in Matlou v Makhubedu
9
 that the 
degree of force used must be proportional to the seriousness of the offence that the 
suspect is suspected of having committed.  
  
The Appellate division through the years repeatedly stated that it was concerned with 
the freedom to use deadly force in circumstances where the suspect is suspected of 
having committed a less serious crime, but is killed during an arrest attempt because he 
attempted to flee.  See R v Britz,
10
 Mazeka v Minister of Justice,
11
 R v Labushagne,
12
 S 
v Marthinus.
13
   
  
Where an accused person was charged with murder or culpable homicide and he or she 
relied on section 49(2)
14
 the accused had to prove the following on a balance of 
probabilities:
15
  
(a) the accused planned to arrest the deceased and was entitled to arrest in terms of 
the CPA;  
(b) the reason for the arrest was that the deceased was reasonably suspected of 
having committed a schedule 1 offence.  The test for the reasonableness of 
the suspicion was an objective test – the facts of the matter had to be of such a 
nature that a reasonable person would have formed the suspicion;  
(c) the deceased resisted the attempt to arrest him or attempted to flee;  
(d) there was no other possible way to stop the flight of the deceased.  The test for 
this requirement is an objective one.  
 
 
 
 
 
8    Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.  
9    1978 (1) SA 946 (A).  
10   1949 (3) SA 293 (A).  
11   1956 (1) SA 312 (A).  
12   1960 (1) SA 632 (A).  
13   1990 (2) SASV 568 (A).  
14   Note 2 above.  
15   R v Britz Note 10 above.  
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Although section 49(2)
16
 only referred to the killing of a suspect, the court in Matlou v 
Makhubedu
17
 held that the word killing should be interpreted to also include cases 
where the suspect was intentionally wounded for purposes of personal accountability.  
In Macu v Du Toit en 'n Ander
 18
 it was held that the requirement of weighing the 
seriousness of the crime against the degree of force used was not contained in section 
49(2).
19
  The court held however, that it was a common law requirement, which the 
court had to apply.  
  
The accused also had to show the absence of culpa ie that he was not negligent with 
regard to the requirements set out in section 49(2).
20
  Where it was not the intention of 
the person attempting the arrest to bring the suspect to justice and there was no 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a schedule 1
21
 offence, the person 
attempting the arrest had no right to shoot at the fleeing suspect (either to kill or wound) 
and if he did so he was liable in accordance with the common law.
22
  
  
2. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S APPROACH  
  
The constitutionality of section 49
23
 was challenged in the Constitutional Court in the 
case of S v Walters
24
.  In the court a quo (the Transkei High Court
25
) it was held that 
despite the decision in the Govender
26
-case, the provisions of section 49(1) and (2)
27
 
were unconstitutional to the extent that it legally sanctioned the use of force to prevent 
the flight of a suspect.  
 
 
16   Note 2 above.  
17   Note 9 above.  
18   1983 (4) SA 329 (A) on 640E.  
19   Note 2 above.  
20   Ibid.  
21   Note 8 above.  
22   Wiesner v Molomo 1983 (3) SA 151 (A).  
23   Note 2 above.  
24   Note 5 above.  
25   S v Walters 2001 (2) SASV 471 (Tk).  
26   Note 4 above.  
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The Constitutional Court stated from the outset that a provision authorising the use of 
force against persons and justifying homicide '…inevitably raises constitutional 
misgivings about its relationship with three elemental rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights.'
28
  These rights are the right to life, to human dignity and the right to bodily 
integrity contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
29
    
  
The court made it clear that the case is not about self-defence or the protection of the 
life or safety of somebody else – the right to defend oneself or someone else from harm 
was not challenged in this case.  Section 49
30
 is also not directed at that right.
31
  The 
court agreed with the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Govender
32
 case on 
the constitutional validity of section 49(1).
33
  
The court considered the constitutionality of section 49(2)
34
 inter alia with reference to 
the United States Supreme Court case Tennessee v Garner
35
 and found the case 
instructive in two ways:  
(a) the unsuitability to draw a distinction for permitting the use of deadly force along 
the felony/misdemeanour line; and  
(b) the need for proportionality when sanctioning the use of deadly forces to perfect 
an arrest.  
  
Kriegler, J, who delivered the judgement, quoted and reiterated Chaskalson P's dictum 
in the case of S v Makwanyane and Another.
36
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27   Note 2 above.  
28   Note 5 above, par (3).  
29   Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the 1996 Constitution.  
30   Note 2 above.  
31   Note 5 above, par (33).  
32   Note 4 above.  
33   Note 5 above, par 39.  
34   Note 2 above.  
35   Tennessee v Garner 417 US 1 (1985).  
36   1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 144.  
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'…The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the 
source of all other personal rights in chap 3.  By committing ourselves to a society 
founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these to rights 
above all others'  
  
The court found that section 49(2)
37
 was rightly held by the court a quo to be 
inconsistent with the right to life, human dignity and bodily integrity.  It found that the 
section did not pass constitutional muster as set out in the limitation clause,
38
primarily 
because of the lack of proportionality between the use of deadly force and the wide 
variety of offences listed in schedule 1 to the CPA.  
  
In summary the court found that section 49(1)
39
 had to be interpreted restrictively in 
such a way that it is a justifiable limitation on the rights to life, human dignity and bodily 
integrity as set out in the Govender
40
case and so as to pass constitutional muster.  
However section 49(2)
41
 was struck down as being unconstitutional mainly because it 
sanctioned the use of deadly force for a wide variety of offences (listed in schedule 1
42
) 
without balancing and weighing the different rights and interests in a proportional 
manner.  Section 49(2)
43
 failed the test contained in the limitation clause and was 
declared invalid.  
  
It must be stressed that the judgement also does not say that a dangerous fugitive 
should be allowed to make an escape when the use of force is all that can prevent it. 
What is interesting about the judgement is that potentially deadly force to arrest a 
fleeing suspect may also be utilised when he has committed a crime involving the 
infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm irrespective of whether the 
suspect poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to others at the stage of 
arrest.  Cognisance is clearly given to the right of the state to ensure that dangerous 
criminals are brought to trial.  The prerequisite is that the crime must involve the 
infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm.  It will in every case be a 
question of fact whether this requirement has been complied with and the test is an 
objective one. The above is the general rule, the SCA in the Govender
44
 case stated 
that there may be exceptions.  
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37  Note 2 above.  
38  Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution.  
39  Note 2 above.  
40  Note 4 above.  
41  Note 2 above.  
42  Note 8 above.  
43  Note 2 above.  
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It must also be kept in mind that even if the person who affects the arrest have 
reasonable grounds for believing that the suspect either   
• poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to himself or members of the public;  
• or has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
bodily harm  
 
potentially deadly force may not be used if other effective means of bringing the suspect 
before a court for trial purposes are possible, for instance were the suspect's address is 
known and the arrest can be effected later.  
  
The Constitutional Court emphasised that the state:  
'... is called upon to set an example of measured, rational, reasonable and proportionate 
response to anti-social conduct and should never be seen to condone, let alone to 
promote, excessive violence against transgressors.'
45
   
  
The court also stated clearly
46
 that it is the duty of the State to play an exemplary role 
and that the state should also promote a culture of respect for human life and dignity.  
The state must be the role model of society and set the example.  If the state thus 
refuses to permit the killing of suspected criminals it projects a message that it is wrong 
to kill.  The court repeated and underscored
47
 the observation in Olmstead v United 
States
48
quoted by Langa J in Makwanyane
49
:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44   Note 4 above.  
45   Note 5 above, par 47.  
46   Note 5 above, par 6.  
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‘Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example.’   
  
It is clear that there is a heavy duty placed on the state to set the example for its 
citizens.  The state should not be allowed to take this duty lightly.  It is therefore 
worrying that despite the fact that the proposed amendment was adopted by Parliament 
in October 1998, assented to by the President on 20 November 1998, and published on 
11 December 1998 it has not yet been put into operation.  Apparently promulgation 
was at first delayed to enable police training to take place.  The President later signed 
a proclamation fixing 1 August 2000 as the date on which the amended sec 49 would 
come into operation.  The proclamation was however not published.  In terms of 
section 81 of the Constitution the Legislature in this case opted to prescribe in the 
enactment that the date of inception is to be determined by the President.  It seems 
that the delay is due to the objections of unworkability (perceived or real) by the Minister 
of Safety and Security.  The Constitutional Court, quite correctly, refused to comment 
on this failure and stated that the amendment bears the stamp of approval of the 
Legislature and could be put into operation within a matter of days.  
  
3 CONCLUSION 
  
The court repeatedly stated that it only dealt with an evaluation of section 49
50
 and not 
with the principles of private defence.  In particular the purpose of section 49
51
 is not to 
regulate the legal position regarding a police officer or any other person’s right to defend 
oneself or someone else against the threat of harm.  The judgement does not detract 
from or jeopardise in any way those rights. The judgement clearly only dealt with the 
boundaries of constitutionally permissible force when arresting or attempting to arrest 
suspects who resist and/or flee.  
 
 
 
47   Note 5 above, par 47.  
48   Olmstead et al v United States of America 277 US 438 (1928).  
49   Note 36 above.  
50   Note 2 above.  
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The fear that the effect of the judgement will be to endanger the lives of the police 
effecting arrests, and that once again the rights of the offender are protected by the 
constitution to the detriment of the innocent, is not well founded.  A police officer or any 
other person whose life is endangered or threatened still has his or her right to 
self-defence. The court acknowledged the fact that under certain circumstances it is 
lawful to use force, including deadly force, on a person suspected of having committed 
a crime, and who resists arrest or tries to escape arrest.   
  
What is however also of interest in this case is the express accepting again by the 
constitutional court of the principle that the state ought to play an exemplary role. In this 
case in promoting a culture of respect for human life and dignity.   
  
It is ironic that in this matter on another aspect the state is not playing an exemplary 
role. Despite the court’s clear finding that the power conferred on the State President by 
section 16 of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 
52
 to fix a date for its 
commencement, is a public power and has to be exercised lawfully for the purpose for 
which it was given, a date for the commencement of the Act has not yet been fixed.  
More than four years have already passed since October 1998 when the Act was 
adopted by parliament.   
  
Hereby the principle of separation of powers as between executive, legislature and 
judiciary, which is acknowledged by the constitution, is breached. The practical 
implication of the present position is in effect that the president is vetoing or at least 
preventing the implementation of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act. This 
situation ought to be addressed as the impression is created that the state itself does 
not act in accordance with the constitution and certainly does not comply with the 
principle that it should play an exemplary role.      
 
 
 
51   Ibid.  
52   Act 122 of 1998.   
